Tools for Cybersecurity

Practical guide · November 16, 2026

How to run a first ransomware tabletop exercise

Use the first exercise to test decisions and handoffs: who takes charge, how the business communicates, which work can continue and who authorizes recovery. Keep it discussion-based. A tabletop can reveal gaps in your plan, but it does not demonstrate that systems have been restored or that an attack has been contained.

CISA publishes exercise packages covering scenarios including ransomware. HHS's ASPR TRACIE resource directory points organizations to those materials. The scenario below is our own simplified discussion exercise, not a reproduction of a CISA package. ASPR TRACIE exercise resource

Give participants one business problem

Hypothetical scenario: On Monday morning, employees cannot access the shared job schedule. Several devices display a ransom message. The company has technicians visiting customers that day, but cannot yet determine whether customer information was accessed.

Invite the people responsible for IT, operations, leadership and communications, plus whoever owns relevant external support arrangements. Assign a facilitator to introduce events and a recorder to capture actual answers. Nobody should make changes to live systems as part of this discussion.

Exercise event Decision to discuss Evidence of preparedness
Main IT contact is unavailable Who can activate the response plan? Named backup with reachable contact details
Email may be affected How will the team coordinate? Approved alternate communications method
Dispatch cannot see appointments Which work can safely continue? Accessible continuity procedure
Customer asks whether data was stolen Who reviews and authorizes the response? Named decision owner and escalation path
A backup is available Who decides it is safe and sufficient to restore? Recovery acceptance criteria and responsible people

The events are prompts, not instructions for incident containment or a universal response order.

Run the discussion in a fixed window

Suggested 60-minute agenda, adaptable to the organization: the facilitator reads the scenario, the recorder captures decisions, IT explains technical dependencies, operations owns continuity, leadership owns spending/risk decisions and communications owns approved messages. Assign distinct roles even if one person covers several jobs.

  1. Minutes 0–10: agree scope, exercise-only status and the known facts. Identify the incident lead and backup.
  2. Minutes 10–20: inject 1—the IT contact cannot be reached. Have the backup demonstrate where the escalation contacts are stored.
  3. Minutes 20–30: inject 2—email and the job schedule are unavailable. Agree the alternate coordination channel and which field work can safely continue.
  4. Minutes 30–40: inject 3—a customer asks whether information was stolen. Draft a holding response that separates known facts from uncertainty and identify its approver.
  5. Minutes 40–50: inject 4—a backup exists, but access instructions may be missing. Name the recovery acceptance owner and the evidence required before declaring dispatch restored.
  6. Minutes 50–60: review unanswered decisions and assign corrective actions. Stop the exercise without changing live systems.

Fictional after-action record, exercise held November 16:

Gap observed Owner and action Due date Closure evidence
Alternate contacts were only on the unavailable drive Operations lead stores approved contacts in the alternate channel Nov 18 Backup lead retrieves them during a follow-up demonstration
Nobody could authorize emergency spending Leadership records a decision owner and escalation process Nov 19 Operations can locate the approval record and explain how to use it
Recovery scope omitted site-access attachments IT and dispatch revise the restore-test scope Nov 23 Controlled restore record shows dispatch can open required attachments

All three actions are open in this fictional record. Dates are exercise planning choices, not required response deadlines. Add every material gap; there is no quota of three changes.

Record gaps instead of supplying ideal answers

If a participant says “our provider handles that,” ask where the responsibility is documented and how to contact the provider outside business hours. If nobody knows, record the gap. Do not let the facilitator rescue every uncertainty by imagining a service the company has not arranged.

Likewise, “we have backups” does not resolve who can access them, which business process they cover or whether restoration has been tested. Put those questions into follow-up work; do not mark recovery demonstrated by discussion.

Assign and verify the corrective actions

In the fictional exercise, the team discovers that the alternate contact list is stored only in the affected shared drive, the operations manager cannot authorize emergency spending and nobody owns customer-message approval.

A useful record assigns each gap to an owner, identifies the required change and sets a completion date. For example: “Operations lead will make the approved continuity contacts available through the agreed alternate channel and demonstrate retrieval at the follow-up meeting.”

Choose the next exercise around the most important unresolved dependency. A later controlled restore test can evaluate technical recovery separately. Keep attendance, decisions and corrective actions so the next discussion tests whether the changes worked, rather than repeating the same scenario from scratch.

Evidence reviewed November 16, 2026. This is an original hypothetical exercise. The CISA package itself was not fully retrieved; no claim of executing or validating its procedure is made.